

Foreword

Gregory P. Marchildon

Much has been said about Tommy Douglas's vision of a New Jerusalem and his provincial government's ability to turn a relatively isolated and poverty-stricken province into Canada's most important social policy laboratory from 1944 until the early 1960s. At the same time, virtually nothing has been written on how this was actually accomplished. The one exception was a Harvard Ph.D. dissertation completed in 1963.¹ Its author was A.W. Johnson, a Saskatchewan civil servant on educational leave from the provincial government.² While difficult to obtain, Johnson's thesis filled such an important gap in the literature that it was actively sought out and cited in subsequent articles and monographs dealing with the Saskatchewan government during the CCF years. And although much has been published on Tommy Douglas and the political dimension of his government, very little touches on Douglas's actual administration, including policy implementation and program management. This would have been reason enough to publish the dissertation four decades after it was written.

What follows, however, is much more. Rather than simply allowing his dissertation to be published in its existing form, Johnson spent more than three years rewriting. Instead of spending time with family amid friends that should have been the reward for a lifetime devoted to the public interest, he closeted himself in his home office reviewing and summarizing all the secondary literature so that he could evaluate and rewrite what he had written before. He phoned up old colleagues with whom he had worked and asked for their recollection of this or that policy, program, department, agency, or commission as a check against the secondary sources, his own memory, and what he himself had recorded. He then summarized what he discovered in new

passages throughout the manuscript. The end result of all this hard labour is, at long last, the published biography of what is now regarded as Canada's most socially innovative government of the twentieth century. Johnson's major contribution is to explain, in detail, just how the Douglas government achieved most of its ambitious objectives. In particular, he describes the evolution of what Christopher Dunn calls the institutionalized cabinet, a move that predated all other provincial governments and went further in some respects than parallel developments in Ottawa.³ A desire for effective planning was at the heart of this development, and Johnson was one of those lucky young individuals who joined the government just as it was beginning to experiment with these new structures.

Planning and the Institutionalized Cabinet

Before the end of its first term, the Douglas government had established the central agencies that would spearhead its planning efforts. Two remarkable advisors were behind these early developments — George Cadbury and T.H. McLeod. Though heir to the wealthy English chocolate family, Cadbury was a Fabian socialist who understood modern planning techniques and organizations. Brought into the government by Tommy Douglas shortly after the end of the war, Cadbury established the Economic Advisory and Planning Board (EAPB) as well as the secretariat that would support it. Despite the fact that the EAPB was a cabinet committee, Cadbury acted as its first Chair. Its mandate was long-term planning generally, but it concentrated on the economic development policies that would put the province on a more prosperous trajectory after the devastation of the Great Depression.⁴

T.H. McLeod had been Tommy Douglas's urban organizer before and during the successful political campaign of 1944. After the election, he turned his hand to government organization, eventually working with Cadbury on the new planning structures. McLeod became the secretary of the EAPB and managed the new planning secretariat. This body would soon spin off two new central agencies — the Budget Bureau and the Government Finance Office. After examining the U.S. Bureau of the Budget, McLeod adapted the basic structure to a small Westminster-style cabinet government, allowing for a more dynamic and systematic approach to expenditure budgeting and planning. The Budget Bureau would soon become the secretariat for a revitalized Treasury Board, a cabinet committee made up of the provincial treasurer as

Chair and two additional cabinet ministers with the deputy provincial treasurer acting as secretary, the position soon taken up by McLeod.⁵

In contrast, the Government Finance Office (GFO) was responsible for overseeing the operations of the province's public enterprises through the GFO Board, a third cabinet committee that acted as the Treasury Board for the province's Crown corporations. Cadbury over saw the GFO in this initial stage, but it was a Rhodes scholar and lawyer by the name of Allan Blakeney, who came from Nova Scotia via Oxford University, who would put his stamp on the central agency as the GFO's secretary and legal advisor from 1950 until 1955.⁶

Al Johnson was both a witness to, and a direct participant in, these developments. Born and raised in small-town Saskatchewan, Johnson did his first degree at the University of Saskatchewan and then moved on to graduate work in public administration at the University of Toronto. The election of a new and exciting government at home emitted its siren call. In July 1945, immediately after completing his degree, he came home to work in the highly controversial Adult Education Division.⁷ Then in the fall of 1946, he was plucked out of his job to join what would soon become the new Budget Bureau under T.H. McLeod. Beyond the tasks of expenditure planning and control, both Cadbury and McLeod wanted the Budget Bureau to provide an ongoing stream of advice on the machinery of government generally in order to improve performance on a systematic basis. Who better to bring in than a young and energetic analyst who had been formally tutored in government administration and who was already showing some aptitude for fusing policy objectives with the organizational structures and processes required to achieve them?⁸

By 1949 the Budget Bureau had become a real organization with a small but expert staff. Johnson was officially named the director of administrative management, the arm of the Budget Bureau responsible for providing ongoing advice to the Douglas cabinet on the machinery of government. Johnson had a staff of five analysts, a number that would double over the next three years. Informally known as the Organization and Methods (O & M) unit, it completed roughly two major departmental organization surveys plus five to six smaller studies per year. He would describe the work of the new unit, as well as its potential for governments beyond Saskatchewan, in his first major presentation to the Institute of Public Administration of Canada (IPAC), an organization that was created by civil servants like him in large part to facilitate the

exchange of ideas among the new breed of public sector managers in the country.⁹

The dissemination of what he considered to be major advances in public policy and administration would be a recurring theme in Johnson's life. As a regular contributor to the IPAC journal as well as other scholarly publications, Johnson used his practical and theoretical knowledge to challenge existing policies and practices as well as to explore new policies and organizational forms. He became part of a coterie of modernizers who saw government as a positive catalyst of change in post-war Canada. In his words, IPAC was the meeting ground to discuss 'the methods and problems of government administration in Canada.' Since these gatherings facilitated the 'open examination' of what had 'formerly been guarded from public scrutiny,' IPAC quickly attracted an academic membership eager to explore the secrets of cabinet government. In Johnson's view, IPAC's ultimate objective was to ensure that government decision-making be done within a framework' that provided 'as far as possible for an objective consideration of the facts and implications involved in any policy question under consideration.¹⁰ He contributed to this through writing dozens of articles that appeared in both journals and edited book-length collections, becoming quite possibly the most published civil servant in Canada during the past half century, a major accomplishment given the hectic life of a senior official. This work would be recognized when Johnson received the Gold Medal from the Professional Institute of the Public Services of Canada in 1975, the Vanier Medal from IPAC a year later, and the Public Policy Forum's award for public service in 1996. This pronounced ability to mix practice with scholarly detachment was noted when Johnson was showered with honorary doctorates from universities across the country as well as being made a Companion of the Order of Canada.

In 1952, Johnson was promoted to the position of deputy provincial treasurer and secretary to the Treasury Board, positions he would hold for the next twelve years. During all these years, he was also a sitting member of the Planning Board as well as the GFO Board. Simply put, his job was to raise revenues adequate to the government's program requirements and to manage overall expenditures so that they would not exceed revenues. But this was no mere technical exercise in Johnson's view. He would later describe a budget as the meeting point of the decision-making process, the point at which all government's diverse priorities and policies and programs must somehow be brought together into an integrated and hopefully harmonious whole.¹¹

Compare this to the analogy (often used by senior treasury officials) of the budget-making process as sausage making!

During this time, Johnson became steeped in intergovernmental relations. He was a key member of the Continuing Committee on Fiscal and Economic Matters, first established in 1955. Over its long life, the committee would focus on three issues: (1) designing and fine-tuning equalization; (2) financing of shared-cost programs; and (3) managing taxation in fields occupied by both governments. Johnson used his intergovernmental experiences in these early years to formulate some definitive views concerning the federation; in particular, the leadership role of the federal government in furthering the national dimensions of key social policies and programs such as medicare and post-secondary education, and in ensuring that these services were made available to all Canadians.¹²

Johnson's minister throughout this extraordinary period was Clarence M. Fines, an enigmatic character whose legacy was to act as the fiscal balance wheel in the Douglas government. His directing of the Provincial Treasury as well as the Treasury Board would produce balanced budgets for the sixteen years of his tenure, and his departments Budget Bureau provided the organizational advice that would keep the rest of the government's machinery at the cutting edge.¹³ Fines was not an easy man to know or understand. He developed the reputation of being the one minister who was always prepared to sacrifice the dreams of the CCF on the altar of fiscal probity, but, in fact, he was one of the original founders of the party, with a deep belief in its philosophical objectives.¹⁴ Johnson had tremendous respect for Fines, and this respect was reciprocated, the product of each understanding his respective role. In the gray area of policy origination, the trick was to provide policy suggestions and options without appropriating the right of the minister to set the general direction of policy. When Johnson wrote his now famous article on the role of the deputy minister in 1961, he must have had Clarence Fines in mind when describing the special relationship between a deputy and his minister: 'Each of them comes to know each other: his strengths and weaknesses, his interests and his blind spots, his insights and his obtuseness. So in the process of formulating policy each comes to look to the other to contribute those particular capacities and talents which he knows him to possess.'¹⁵

In the same way that Johnson and Fines complemented each other with their very different skills and compensated for each other's weaknesses, Fines and Tommy Douglas complemented (and compensated for) each other as the

senior political leaders of the CCF government. While Fines led the government from an administrative and financial perspective, Douglas provided the vision and long-term political direction. History has largely ignored Fines, but you cannot walk away from this book without the impression that he was an essential ingredient in the success of the Douglas government.

Clarence Fines was effective, in part, because he left the management of his department to his most senior official while he provided the political direction. Al Johnson, in turn, was committed to bringing in the most talented young individuals he could find anywhere in the country. Like all central agency staff, Budget Bureau analysts were hired through Orders in Council rather than through the Public Service Commission. This allowed a large number to be hired directly from universities throughout Canada without having had previous government experience. Through his personal contacts with prominent professors in numerous universities, Johnson received inside information on ‘up and coming’ students. He also welcomed opportunities to give seminars on public administration and policy at universities to interest bright young minds in a career in government.¹⁶ He publicly stated that one of the most important jobs of any senior public executive is to attract and develop ‘precious’ individuals, those that stand out among the rest because of their talent, devotion, and hard work. Many will agree in principle, but few in practice. To make his point, he asked a series of rhetorical questions:

What percentage of the time of senior executives in departments is devoted to finding top flight people for the public service? What percentage of their time is devoted to giving seminars in universities to make known to students and professors alike the nature of the work of particular agencies of government and thus to making attractive to the best of them work in the public service? What emphasis do senior executives give to ensuring that their most promising people get the right mixture of training and at the optimum pace — experience in jobs of different kinds, educational leave, a posting to another government, language training, even a permanent appointment to another department?¹⁷

Johnson’s emphasis on the quality of individual civil servants was based on his personal philosophy that the most important input to an organization that produced policies and programs was people. In his view, creativity was a

personal act, the product of creative minds, not of structures or committees or manuals of instruction. So to ask what are the conditions of creativity in government, or anywhere else for that matter, is to ask what are the conditions which unleash, and enlarge, and enhance the creativity of the human mind.’¹⁸

Budget Bureau trainees who were not recruited directly from the University of Saskatchewan came to the province from other Canadian universities, with a concentration from Queen’s University, Carleton University, and the University of Toronto. They would work in the Budget Bureau for a couple of years and then move on to more senior appointments in the line departments, a natural progression that became a distinguishing mark of the Saskatchewan public service until the early 1980s. After the defeat of the CCF government in 1964, a sizeable number of the graduates of the Budget Bureau went to the federal government as senior public servants, where they would influence the direction of the country itself.

A.W. Johnson and the Saskatchewan Diaspora

In 1961, shortly after passing the legislation that gave birth to medicare in the province, Tommy Douglas left the Premier’s Office to become the national leader of the newly created New Democratic Party. As Douglas’s successor, Woodrow Lloyd implemented the program in the face of a powerful coalition that had mobilized against it. The doctors’ strike of 1962, and the polarization and bitterness that accompanied it, affected Al Johnson and his colleagues for life.¹⁹ The aftershock of this policy, combined with the growing public desire for changing a government that had been in power for two successive decades, helped elect the Liberals under Ross Thatcher in 1964.

Many months before the election, having decided that it was time to tackle new challenges, Johnson had accepted the position of assistant deputy minister in the federal Department of Finance. Everyone came to know this, including Thatcher, who asked Lloyd if he could seek advice on the public service from Johnson, given the fact that he was leaving the government anyway. Lloyd agreed and Johnson ended up talking to Thatcher. Emphasizing the competence and ability that had been built up over the years, he convinced Thatcher to keep some of the people in the Budget Bureau and other central agencies, but nothing could stop some from leaving voluntarily and others from being fired, given Thatcher’s electoral promise to get rid of all the ‘CCF bureaucrats.’²⁰

The exodus of these civil servants would hurt Saskatchewan but enrich the rest of the country. While some provincial governments, in particular the modernizing Robichaud administration in New Brunswick, would profit from this exodus from Saskatchewan, the federal government benefited most. Elected just the year before, Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson was building a modern welfare state, and a large number of the Saskatchewan diaspora found a more congenial home for their talents. Aside from Johnson, other important catches included Tommy Shoyama and Don Tansley.

Tommy Shoyama was one of a small coterie of Japanese Canadians brought into the Saskatchewan public service at a time when they faced a high degree of discrimination elsewhere.²¹ As secretary to the Economic Advisory and Planning Board from 1950 until 1964, Shoyama was a key advisor on economic and social policy to Tommy Douglas and then Woodrow Lloyd. He came into the Pearson government via the new Economic Council of Canada under John Deutsch and eventually became the deputy minister of finance in the Trudeau government.²²

Don Tansley had run the Budget Bureau for many years, and for one year had been acting deputy treasurer while Johnson was on leave at Harvard. He had also served as Chair of the Medical Care Insurance Commission, which had been charged with medicare's implementation in the early 1960s.²³ After serving as deputy minister of finance and industry in New Brunswick, Tansley went to Ottawa as senior vice-president of the Canadian International Development Agency, eventually becoming the first deputy minister of fisheries and oceans.²⁴

The other bureaucrats from Saskatchewan were spread out through the federal public service, although a particularly large number clustered in the Department of Finance. Collectively, they became known-with both affection and respect — as the 'Saskatchewan Mafia.' From the beginning, Al Johnson was seen as their leading member. In a *Maclean's* cover story on 'The Ottawa Establishment' just months after his rival in Ottawa as assistant deputy minister of finance, Johnson was identified by Peter Newman as a member of the country's exclusive power elite. Classified as one of eleven sub-mandarins, he was placed in the same company as Simon Reisman (deputy minister of industry) and A.E. Ritchie (deputy under-secretary of state for external affairs).²⁵ In charge of federal-provincial relations and tax policy, he played a pivotal role in establishing equalization, helping expand post-secondary education through a workable federal funding formula, and finding an intergovernmental solution to the implementation of national medicare.²⁶

Through the support and active sponsorship of Robert Bryce, the deputy minister of finance, Johnson was thrust into the heart of the Pearson administration, and his impact on the government's domestic policy direction was arguably second only to Tom Kent, Pearson's chief policy advisor in the Prime Minister's Office. The national medicare story is briefly recounted here as a postscript to the Saskatchewan medicare story, and the evolution of equalization is touched upon in the Annex, but you will find no mention of federal funding of post-secondary education in this book. It is worth a comment.

As a country, we have largely forgotten the intergovernmental statecraft that would allow the federal government to partner with the provinces in the remarkable expansion of post-secondary education — with enrolment of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds doubling within a decade, more than responding to the baby boom. Moreover, this expansion was funded on the back of an intergovernmental agreement that did not infringe on provincial jurisdiction over education and included Quebec on the same terms and conditions as all other provinces.²⁷ Johnson played a central role in forging this 1967 agreement. He learned much about the political and economic dynamics of the Canadian federation from these and similar experiences, which he attempted to summarize in the inaugural issue of the *Canadian Journal of Political Science* early in 1968.

Thinking long and hard about the very nature of the country, Johnson came to the conclusion that federalism was by definition 'a compromise between the conflicting elements of unity and diversity within a single state' and that this compromise is subject to continual change within a federation as dynamic as Canada's. Surprisingly for a civil servant, he bluntly spelled out the country's future options, including associate state status for Quebec.²⁸ Shortly after, Pierre Trudeau took over from Lester B. Pearson as prime minister. He appointed Johnson as his economic advisor on the constitution, an open-ended position that gave Johnson the latitude to work on federal—provincial issues free of major administrative responsibilities.

In 1970, Johnson was made secretary (the equivalent of deputy minister) to the Treasury Board, and he returned to the familiar business of fiscal planning, and budgeting, but now on a national scale.²⁹ His Saskatchewan experience had a direct impact, however, in the manner in which the Treasury Board secretariat conducted its program reviews. In a manner similar to how the major department organization surveys were conducted by the Budget Bureau, he insured that his secretariat personnel worked jointly with the personnel of

the department affected by any given program review. In the same way that Tommy Shoyama had sat in on Treasury Board meetings and Johnson on Economic Advisory and Planning Board meetings in the Douglas government, it was arranged that one official from the secretariat supporting the Cabinet Committee on Priorities and Planning would sit in on Treasury Board meetings and vice versa.³⁰

Johnson remained secretary of the Treasury Board until early 1973 when Trudeau decided to launch a major review of Canada's social security system. Johnson suggested that it be a joint federal-provincial review, given the primary role of the provinces in providing income security and social services. Trudeau agreed despite his own, more centralist, view of the federation. In the throne speech that year, the government of Canada announced that it would attempt to harmonize, integrate, and rationalize the federal and provincial elements of the current system in order to provide individual Canadians with a far more effective system.³¹

To accomplish this, Trudeau appointed his most trusted cabinet member, Marc Lalonde, as the new minister of national welfare, and Johnson as the new deputy minister. By April, the new minister and his deputy produced a working paper on social security in Canada that set out some basic principles and objectives from the national perspective. Dubbed the orange paper because of the colour of its cover, this document launched the three-year review with the provinces. While rejecting a single guaranteed income system as a replacement for all of the existing federal and provincial income security programs, it did put forward a series of strategies to achieve a more universal system to replace the various means-tested income supplementation systems in the country.³²

Those years in the Trudeau administration marked a period of consolidation for Johnson as he took his past experience and applied it to improving the existing system both in terms of public administration and in terms of updating and improving social policies and programs. It would end with his appointment as president of the CBC and his entry into the world of radio and television broadcasting in 1975.

President of the CBC

Although new to the CBC, Johnson was no stranger to cultural affairs. Always a great patron of the visual arts, Johnson had initiated a policy in Saskatchewan as deputy provincial treasurer that every new building financed by the government be required to set aside 1 per cent of capital costs for the purchase

of works of art. Combining his position in government with his membership on the University of Saskatchewan's board of governors, he supported the creation of a Faculty of Fine Arts at the (then) Regina campus of the university. It would soon become famous as the home of a nationally renowned group of painters known as the Regina Five. As secretary of the Treasury Board in Ottawa, he helped steer through the idea of the Art Bank, which was instrumental in getting Canadian works of art into almost all federal government offices and encouraging painters and sculptors throughout the country. In addition, Johnson had been a board member of the National Film Board since 1970.

For Johnson, the CBC was an institution that mirrored the country. Just as Canada was 'economically implausible, painfully diverse, and full of contradictions' but also 'one of the freest, most creative, most humane, most exciting, most successful countries on earth,' so was the CBC. Johnson used a musical metaphor. The breadth of intelligence and talent that resided within its creative body ensured that the CBC understood 'the point-counterpoint character of Canada,' with the 'point being the voice of nationhood and the counterpoint being the linguistic, and cultural and regional voices.'³³ The national dimensions were important to building the country, but the diverse regional, cultural, and linguistic voices also had to be heard, and Johnson was a staunch supporter of regional programming and centres.

He saw the CBC as an 'agent of development for the skills of the Canadian creative community. Returning to Johnson's musical metaphor the CBC was the conductor, ensuring the proper 'combination of simultaneous voice parts, each of them independent,' but all producing a coherent and integrated piece of work.'³⁴ To succeed, no one should be allowed to overwhelm or drown out the others, and some voices would have to be encouraged.

At the onset, Johnson had two principal objectives. The first was to increase the quantity, quality, and exposure of Canadian programs and programming. The second was to modernize the CBC, so that it would become a catalyst in broadcasting and the evolution of Canadian culture in light of the information and communications technology revolution.'³⁵ He found radio in very healthy shape; in his view (shared by many) CBC Radio was quite simply the best in the world. CBC TV was another story. American television was in danger of overwhelming Canadian broadcasting, and he sought greater resources to invest in new Canadian programming as well as a proposed new channel that would distinguish itself from commercial television. Despite some considerable achievements on other fronts, Johnson would be disappointed

both by the government of Canada and its regulatory arm, the Canadian Radio and Television Commission (CRTC), in rejecting his ‘Canadianization’ strategy. After leaving the CBC in 1982, Johnson wrote of his disappointment with government and CRTC support, and continued to put forward policy prescriptions to improve the state of Canadian broadcasting and, with it, an independent cultural space for the country.³⁶

Academic and Consulting Life

Now closing in on sixty years of age, Johnson became an academic, a career for which he had been preparing for decades. After a one-year appointment as Skelton-Clark Fellow at Queen’s University, he joined the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto as a professor of public policy and administration. For seven years, he would commute between Ottawa and Toronto, working on a comprehensive methodological approach to policy-making, while teaching about the real world of government. Many of his students were struck by the way in which he combined a far-sighted and progressive vision with an equally tough-minded emphasis on structure and prudent fiscal administration. For Johnson, idealism was a vital quality in the public service, always providing it could be translated into effective and sustainable action. In this, he simply reflected the prevailing ethos of the Douglas government.

Following a further two-year stint as a senior research fellow at the Canadian Centre for Management Development (CCMD) in Ottawa, Johnson returned to the front lines as an international public administration consultant in 1991.³⁷ First, he went to Indonesia on behalf of the International Monetary Fund to study and report on national—provincial fiscal arrangements. Then he led a mission to the Republic of South Africa as that country began to undergo its transition to a multiracial democracy. This was succeeded by a more permanent program on governance in South Africa that Johnson would direct until 1999. His experience as a provincial and federal civil servant was directly relevant to the job of helping the South Africans establish provinces within a new federation. From the beginning, his trusting relationship with senior members of the new ANC government and Nelson Mandela’s support of the program were the cornerstones of the initiative.

I first met Al Johnson in Johannesburg, South Attica. A participant in his governance project, I was on my way to Bloemfontein to discuss cabinet committee systems with the provincial government of Free State, based upon

my experience as cabinet secretary in Saskatchewan. I had just finished reading Al's thesis in the course of trying to understand the evolution of the cabinet system in Saskatchewan, and asked him whether he had ever considered getting it published. 'Not really' was the answer. He had found himself back on the front lines of government work the moment he left Harvard, having to finish his dissertation while assisting the government during the last difficult months of the introduction of medicare. While he spent evenings and weekends working on articles throughout his career, he never had the time to work on a full-length book.

In 1999 Johnson returned to Canada permanently, and I raised the issue again. No longer on the front line, he seemed more receptive. But since he also knew it would involve a considerable investment of time, he insisted that an independent third party read the manuscript to see if it was worth reworking into a book. So the thesis was sent to Peter Aucoin, a highly respected professor of political science and public administration at Dalhousie University for another review. When Aucoin concluded that the investment of time would indeed be worth while, Johnson began work on the manuscript.

When visiting Ottawa on other business, I would stop in at the Johnson household and ask about some of the obvious themes emerging from the manuscript. But on one occasion I asked a less obvious, and more intrusive, question. Why had he never become a politician himself? After all, he was hardly the traditionally dispassionate and apolitical civil servant. He shared fully in the ideals and objectives of the Douglas government. He had gone far beyond the call of bureaucratic duty in furthering the progressive social agenda of the Pearson government.³⁸ And he was as close to politicians as civil servants can get in their careers. In response, Johnson cast his mind back to when he was seventeen years old and a long conversation he had had with J.S. Woods—worth in Vancouver in 1941.

Johnson knew Woodsworth through his father, who was a United Church minister. Reverend Johnson had studied theology in Winnipeg's Wesley College, when Salem Bland was still teaching there, and when J.S. Woodsworth was leading the All Peoples Mission in that city. Then trying to recover from a stroke at home, Woodsworth had asked to see Johnson, who was working in British Columbia for the summer break from the University of Saskatchewan. Woodsworth spent more than three hours recounting the story of his life as a social activist and political leader. As Johnson was preparing to

leave, he was told the real reason for the invitation to talk. Woodsworth wanted him to go into politics, the best possible way to realize the ideal of a more just society.

Understandably, Johnson was moved by Woodsworth's vision and his advice. For many years, he continued to believe that he might become a politician. But after spending considerable time in the Saskatchewan public service and watching that great master politician Tommy Douglas, he concluded (not surprisingly, given his point of reference) that he did not possess the required range of qualities and talents. Moreover, he realized that a role behind the scenes was much more congenial to his personality. Behind the scenes these roles may have been, but his work as a public servant had an appreciable impact on the evolution and direction of Canadian government and society. And many of Johnson's most important achievements had their origins in the Douglas government of Saskatchewan.

Notes

1. Albert Wesley Johnson, 'The Biography of a Government: Policy Formulation in Saskatchewan, 1944-61' (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1963).
2. On the Douglas's government's policy of educational leave, see Robert I. McLaren, *The Saskatchewan Practice of Public Administration in Historical Perspective* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), 99—100.
3. Christopher Dunn, *The Institutionalized Cabinet: Governing the Western Provinces* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995).
4. Robert I. McLaren, 'George Woodall Cadbury: The Fabian Catalyst in Saskatchewan's "Good Public Administration,"' *Canadian Public Administration* 37.1 (Spring 1994), 51-64; George Cadbury, 'Planning in Saskatchewan,' in *Essay on the Left*, ed. Laurier LaPierre et al. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971). Interview with George Cadbury, 15 June, 1981 and 21 Jan. 1982, Saskatchewan Archives Board (Regina), R-8343 to R-8345.
5. AW Johnson, 'The Treasury Board in Saskatchewan.' *Proceedings of the 7th Annual Conference of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada* (1955); T.H. McLeod, 'Public Enterprise in Saskatchewan: 'The Development of Public Policy and Administrative Controls' (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1959); T.H. McLeod and Ian McLeod. *Tommy Douglas: The Road to Jerusalem* (Edmonton: Hurtig, 1987). Interview with T.H. McLeod, 25 and 28 Nov. 1981, Saskatchewan Archives Board (Regina). R-8444 to R8448

6. On the GFO, see Dennis Gruending, *Promises to Keep: A Political Biography of Allan Blakeney* (Saskatoon: Prairie Books, 1990); Allan Blakeney and Sanford Borins, *Political Management in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 133—7; and McLaren, *The Saskatchewan Practice of Public Administration*, 115—18.
7. Michael Welton, 'Conflicting Visions, Divergent Strategies: Watson Thomson and the Cold War Politics of Adult Education in Saskatchewan, 1944—46,' *Labour/ Le Travail* 18 (Fall 1986): 111—38.
8. Interview with A.W. Johnson, 9 Feb. 1982, Saskatchewan Archives Board (Regina), R-8426 to R-8427.
9. Walter Gordon and A.W. Johnson, 'Government, Organization and Method Units versus External Management Units,' *Proceedings of the 4th Annual Conference of the Institute of Public Administration of Canada* (1952), 27—47.
10. Johnson, 'The Treasury Board in Saskatchewan,' 112.
11. A.W. Johnson, 'The Treasury Board of Canada and the Machinery of Government of the 1970s,' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4.3 (Sept. 1971): 347.
12. This was most clearly expressed in A.W. Johnson, 'Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations: An Historical Perspective,' in *Ottawa and the Provinces: The Distribution of Money and Power*, ed. David W. Conklin (Toronto: Ontario Economic Council, 1985), 107—43.
13. See Gruending, *Promises to Keep*, 31. Fines resigned just before the general election of 1960, perhaps because of the controversy surrounding his marital situation (Fines had left his wife) and the 'constant gossip about the wealth he had accumulated from shrewd personal investments while he was Treasurer.'
14. At least this is Johnson's assessment, and he got to know Fines better than anyone else in the government, with the possible exception of Tommy Douglas.
15. A.W. Johnson, 'The Role of the Deputy Minister: III,' *Canadian Public Administration* 4.4 (Fall 1961): 369. This article was reprinted in Kenneth Kernaghan, ed., *Public Administration in Canada* (Toronto: Methuen, 1985).
16. A.W. Johnson, 'Education and the Development of Senior Executives,' *Canadian Public Administration* 15.4 (Fall 1972)
17. A.W. Johnson, 'Productivity, People and the Public Service.' *Optimum* 2. 1 (1971): 17.
18. A.W. Johnson, 'Public Policy: Creativity and Bureaucracy,' *Canadian Public Administration* 21.1 (Spring 1978): 3.
19. Robin F. Badgely and Samuel Wolfe, *Doctors' Strike: Medical Care and Conflict in Saskatchewan* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967)

20. For two different views on the transition, see Norman Ward, 'Changing the Guard at Regina,' *Canadian Forum* 44 (Sept. 1964): 127—8; and Meyer Brownstone, 'Another View on the Saskatchewan Government,' *Canadian Forum* 44 (Dec. 1964): 198—200.
21. Others included George Tamaki (first secretary of the GFO under George Cadbury) and Arthur Wakabayashi (Budget Bureau analyst and later deputy provincial treasurer).
22. 'Thomas Kunito Shoyama,' in *Canadian Who's Who* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 1181.
23. The commission was established in 1962. According to Dennis Gruending (*Promises to Keep* 39—40), the government could not find a doctor acceptable to the profession to chair the commission, forcing it to look to the civil service. Tansley apparently took the job after asking if the position 'included danger pay.'
24. 'Donald Dougans Tansley,' in *Canadian Who's Who* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 1263; Della M.M. Stanley, *Louis Robichaud: A Decade of Power* (Halifax: Nimbus, 1984), 93—4.
25. Peter Newman, 'The Ottawa Establishment,' *Maclean's*, 22 Aug. 1964, pp. 7—9, 30—8.
26. In *A Public Purpose: An Experience of Liberal Opposition and Canadian Government* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), 366, Tom Kent generously gave Johnson full credit for finding the solution.
27. A.W. Johnson, 'Stop Neglecting Research,' Policy Options 7.4 (May 1986): 12—15. On the history of the post-secondary federal-provincial arrangement, see A.W. Johnson, *Giving Greater Point and Purpose to the Federal Financing of Post-Secondary Education and Research* (Ottawa: Task Force Report for the Secretary of State of Canada, 1985); and Johnson, 'Federal-Provincial Fiscal Relations.'
28. A.W. Johnson, 'The Dynamics of Federalism in Canada,' *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 1.1 (March 1968): 18—39; reprinted in Peter Meekison, ed., *The Dynamics of Federalism in Canada: Myth or Reality* (Toronto: Methuen, 1968).
29. Of course, the nature of budgeting itself had evolved since his Saskatchewan as he himself described; see A.W. Johnson, 'Planning, Programming, and Budgeting in Canada,' *Public Administration Review* 63. 1 (Jan./Feb. 1973): 23—31.
30. On the administrative and policy objectives behind the Treasury Board secretariat, see A.W. Johnson, 'The Treasury Board of Canada and the

- Machinery of Government in the 1970s.’ *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4.3 (1971): 346—66.
31. A.W. Johnson, ‘Canada’s Social Security Review, 1973—75: The Central Issues,’ *Canadian Public Policy* 1.4 (1975): 457.
 32. Government of Canada, *Working Paper on Social Security in Canada*, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: Minister of National Health and Welfare, 18 April 1973). See also A.W. Johnson, ‘Canada’s Social Security Review: The Central Issues,’ *Canadian Public Policy* 1.4 (1975): 456—72; and ‘A Perspective on Social Policy Legislation and Reform’ in *Report on the Policy Forum on Universality and Social Policies in the 1990s*, ed. Alan Green and Nancy Olewiler (Kingston: John Deutsch Institute, 1985), 1—6.
 33. A.W. Johnson, ‘Fifty-Fifty TV,’ *Policy Options* 9.3 (April 1988): 18.
 34. Ibid.
 35. A.W. Johnson, ‘Culture, Broadcasting and the Canadian Identity,’ *SMPTE Journal* 91 (April 1982): 346—52.
 36. See A.W. Johnson, ‘Prescriptions for Broadcasting in Canada: Looking through the Burlap Bag,’ *Queen’s Quarterly* 90.2 (1983): 457—65; ‘Broadcasting in Canada: The Ideal and the Reality,’ *Policy Options* 4.2 (1983): 6-12; and ‘Fifty-Fifty TV,’ *Policy Options* 9.3 (1988): 18—22.
 37. During his time at CCMD, Johnson wrote his most important monograph: *What Is Public Management? An Autobiographical View* (Ottawa: CCMD, 1993).
 38. A.W. Johnson’s own view of Pearson and his legacy can be found in *Pearson: The Unlikely Gladiator*, ed. Norman Hillmer (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 172—4.